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Abstract: 
 Gender differences in competition have been demonstrated in a variety of contexts, yet it 
remains unclear how people respond to competitors they perceive to be hard or easy, and 
whether gender differences exist in this response. I run an experiment in eighteen public high 
school classrooms to study the effect of competing in a math task against different levels of 
competitors. I exploit natural sorting within grade levels in Malaysian public schools to 
randomly assign competitors of different perceived difficulty levels. Using a standard 
competition measure, males are significantly more competitive than females. However, when 
students face harder competitors, males respond by lowering performance while the performance 
of females does not vary significantly by level of competition.  
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1. Introduction 
Many studies have shown that females are less competitive than males in stereotypically 
male tasks (see Niederle and Vesterlund, 2011 for review), which explains some of the gender 
differences in later education and career outcomes (Almås et al., 2016; Buser et al., 2014; Buser 
et al., 2017; Ors et al., 2013; Zhang, 2013). One important aspect of competition is the perceived 
difficulty of the competitors: people may react differently in competition when facing easier or 
harder opponents. Gender differences in these reactions can help explain dynamics of 
competition and inform policy decisions about the characteristics of competitions in schools or 
the workplace. Existing research on the perceived difficulty of the competition primarily relies 
on information provided in a laboratory context which may have limited applicability in the 
field. In the current study, I exploit natural sorting within grade levels to randomly assign 
competitors of different perceived difficulty levels to examine the effect of facing harder 
competitors by gender in addition to replicating the standard gender gap on a math task in 
Malaysian public schools. 
Gender gaps in competition have been categorized by both choice and performance. 
Females are shown to be less likely than males to choose into competition, a well-established 
finding in the literature (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Recent research explores how factors 
such as task or information affect this gender gap (see Niederle, 2016 for review). There is less 
consistent evidence, however, of gender differences in performance in competitive 
environments. A seminal paper finds that females perform worse than males when solving 
puzzles under a competitive incentive scheme, although there is no difference in performance 
under a non-competitive incentive scheme (Gneezy et al., 2003). Other studies use similar 
designs and puzzle tasks with similar results (Datta Gupta et al., 2013; Günther et al., 2010). 
Niederle et al. (2013) finds that males outperform females in math tasks under competition. 
However, other studies show no gender differences in performance under either non-competitive 
or competitive incentives in math tasks (Ertac and Szentes, 2011; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; 
Wozniak et al., 2014).  
The literature indicates that gender differences in competitive performance cannot be 
simply explained by differential ability, which has shifted some recent literature to study how 
features of competition may differentially affect males’ and females’ performance. One aspect of 
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competition is how people respond to harder or easier competitors and whether there are gender 
differences in these responses, the focus of the current study.  
Prior research has examined reactions to different levels of competition by providing 
information or relative feedback during competition1 in a laboratory environment (Buser, 2016; 
Cason et al., 2010; Eriksson et al., 2009; Ertac and Szentes, 2011; Gill and Prowse, 2014; 
Kuhnen and Tymula, 2011; Wozniak et al., 2014), with one recent study conducted in a field 
setting (Wozniak et al., 2016). In these studies, information about either random competitors or 
deliberately lower- or higher-performing competitors is given to subjects prior to subsequent 
competition decisions and performance. 
Rational behavior predicts that people would be more reluctant to enter into competition 
against more difficult competition. Cason et al. (2010) created groups of relatively weaker, 
stronger, or superstar competition and the study finds that, as expected, the fraction of entry into 
a tournament is highest against the weaker group and lowest against the superstar group. No 
breakdown by gender is provided, although there is some indication of gender differences-- 
females under-enter a proportional pay tournament given their expected payout, with no gender 
difference in under- or over-entry for the winner-take-all tournament. A clear gender difference 
in choice of competition is demonstrated in an unpublished study by Niederle and Yestrumskas 
(2008), which shows that females choose a less difficult and less lucrative task than males; 
however, both genders receive lower payout than if they had optimally chosen their task 
difficulty. 
There is consistent evidence that information about target or relative score provided to 
subjects decreases or even eliminates the gender gap in entry into competition (Ertac and 
Szentes, 2011; Wozniak et al., 2014), although Wozniak et al. (2016) finds a persistent gender 
gap in competition entry among low-ability participants even after information is provided. 
However, the effect of information on gender differences in performance is less clear.  
When subjects must compete, there are mixed results in reactions to information about 
competitors. Eriksson et al. (2009) finds that feedback on relative performance does not 
significantly change performance. The study reports positive peer effects in tournaments; 
                                                 
1 The following discussion of existing literature focuses on studies that involve competition in a math-related task 
and explore gender differences, although Gill and Prowse use a slider task specifically designed to measure effort 
(Gill and Prowse, 2014). Other studies examine how information affects performance without any differences in 
incentives and will not be discussed (e.g. Azmat and Iriberri, 2010). 
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frontrunners do not slack off and underdogs rarely quit, although continuous feedback reduces 
the quality but not quantity of effort for underdogs. However, Gill and Prowse (2014) finds that 
subjects reduce effort after a loss, although males reduce effort only after failing to win large 
prizes. Buser (2016) shows somewhat different results depending on gender. Buser created three 
groups based on random pairing in a first round winner-take-all tournament: winners, losers, and 
those who receive scores, which he refers to as the no information group. Losers from the first 
round seek harder challenges, are less successful in the challenges and overall make less money 
in the second round compared to the winners. While there are no gender differences in average 
outcomes, such as the challenge level selected or performance in the challenge, males react to 
losing by becoming more challenge-seeking than winners and females react by lowering their 
performance.  
The findings in these previous studies are contingent on random or contrived information 
about competitors to elicit a reaction from subjects. Although there is a range in the type of 
information provided, from relative scores to more direct messages of winning or losing, the 
explicit information acts as a treatment. The use of explicit information may contribute to results 
in the previous studies-- a study shows that the possibility of receiving feedback induces subjects 
to work harder even when they are not compensated for the extra effort, which demonstrates how 
responsive subjects can be to explicit information (Kuhnen and Tymula, 2011).  
I focus on the effect of competitor level on competition performance, a relatively less 
understood aspect of gender differences in competition. I explore reactions to a subtler but 
realistic scenario of the perception of competitor difficulty, since people often compete with 
incomplete information about their competitors. For example, students may not know their 
rankings in class prior to taking a test; even if these rankings are known from a prior test, they do 
not perfectly transfer to another subject or even another test in the same subject. Despite this 
uncertainty, students must perform on assignments or tests. Thus, it is important to explore how a 
noisier yet realistic signal of competitor difficulty affects performance in competition. Although 
the context is essentially a lab-in-field environment rather than an actual school competition, the 
school setting allows students to compete against meaningful categories of competitors instead of 
relying on artificial competitors created by researchers.  
By closely following Buser et al.’s (2014) protocol used in secondary schools in the 
Netherlands, the current study also provides evidence for replicability of findings in a different 
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context. Cultural context is demonstrated to play a role in gender differences in competition 
(Gneezy et al., 2009), although not necessarily in expected ways (Cárdenas et al., 2012); thus, it 
is important to acknowledge potential cultural influences on these differences. Nearly all of the 
studies use university subject pools in Western countries. To the author’s knowledge, this is the 
first such experiment performed in a Muslim country and one of few performed in Asia. While 
this paper highlights several differences in the Science, Technology, Engineering & Math 
(STEM) and gender context particular to Malaysia, the findings are suggestive of gender 
stereotypes and differences in competition in STEM generally found in the literature. 
The results of this study demonstrate that in a context where the standard gender 
difference in competition entry exists, males appear to be affected by the level of competition 
while females are not. When students face harder competitors, males respond by lowering 
performance while the performance of females does not vary significantly by level of 
competition. These somewhat surprising findings suggest that policies that require females to 
enter into more difficult competitive situations may not be detrimental to their performance in 
these situations. 
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the study 
details, including context, data collection procedures and study design. The results from the 
study are detailed in Section 3. First, I provide descriptive analyses of the behavioral 
characteristics and other control variables used in later analyses. Then, I provide the analyses of 
the standard gender differences in competition (within class competitions). Lastly, I provide 
analyses of the response to different levels of competition (between class competitions). Section 
4 discusses the significance and potential mechanisms of these findings. Section 5 concludes. 
  
2. Study Overview 
2.1 Context 
Gender differences in competition appear to exist at a young age (Eccles et al., 1993; 
Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; Harbaugh et al., 2002; Sutter and Glätzle-Rützler, 2014). These 
early differences may affect the trajectories of individuals’ future decisions and outcomes. To 
understand competition phenomena in a relevant setting, this study uses a sample of high school 
students prior to any academic tracking.  
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This study takes place in public schools in Malaysia, a multicultural developing country 
in Southeast Asia with a majority Muslim population. Malaysia is a useful context for this study 
for several reasons. First, the informal but widespread ranking system within grades in public 
schools provides a unique opportunity to exogenously vary the level of competitor within 
classrooms, which will be discussed further in Section 2.2. Second, the STEM context in 
Malaysia appears to favor females compared to the populations used in prior studies, although 
standard male stereotypes of STEM seem to persist. Several studies view stereotypes associated 
with tasks as potential explanations for gender differences in math task competitions (Dreber et 
al., 2014; Kamas and Preston, 2010; Grosse and Riener, 2010; Günther et al., 2010; Shurchkov, 
2012), thus any competitive differences found in the Malaysian context could help bring insight 
into whether gender differences in competition are similar in an environment with greater female 
STEM participation. 
The Malaysian education system consists of six years of primary school and five years of 
secondary school; during the last two years of secondary school, or upper secondary school2, 
students are placed into academic tracks with different associated prestige: the arts track (less 
prestigious) and the science track (more prestigious). Although there is no official tracking 
policy prior to the last two years of secondary school, many secondary schools use unofficial 
methods3 of ranking and sorting students into classrooms within grade levels. Enrollment in 
preschool, primary school and secondary school is gender-balanced (49%-50% of enrollment is 
female). However, there are differences in gender proportions in the upper secondary school 
academic tracks. In upper secondary school, females constitute about half (47-49%) of the arts 
stream and the majority (about 58-59%) of students in the science streams4. Thus, there are more 
females than males in the most prestigious science track at the upper secondary level (Ministry 
of Education Malaysia, 2014). A similar gender distribution is found in the lower secondary 
Form 35 classes in this study, prior to the official academic tracking (see Section 2.2 for details). 
The female advantage continues in tertiary education. Malaysia has a slightly lower ratio 
than the U.S. of females to males in tertiary education, although in both countries, females make 
                                                 
2 Form 4 & 5 are known as upper secondary and are equivalent to grades 10 & 11. 
3 For example, sorting students into classrooms based solely on overall test scores. 
4 Science and arts streams are the two most common streams; some schools offer “sub-science” or “sub-arts” as 
well. 
5 Equivalent to grade 9. 
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up the majority of tertiary students (Malaysia: 1.21 to US: 1.36). However, nearly half of 
Malaysian female students (46%) versus less than a third of U.S. female students (30%) major in 
STEM fields (World Economic Forum, 2014). In fact, Malaysian females make up the majority 
of entrants, enrollments and graduates in most fields of study in the public universities including 
about two-thirds of graduates in Science, Mathematics and Computer; the only field in which 
females are a minority is Engineering, Manufacturing and Construction (Ministry of Education 
Malaysia, 2015). A qualitative study of the University of Malaya’s6 Computer Science and 
Information Technology department reveals that the majority of faculty, heads of department and 
dean were women in 2001 (Mellström, 2009). Mellström hypothesizes that computer science 
professions may be considered more suitable for females because of the office rather than field 
nature of the work; however, labor market data is limited such that it is not possible to identify 
the percentages of women in these fields.  
Thus, females in Malaysia appear to face a more positive STEM climate in education 
than in many other countries. Nevertheless, gendered stereotypes for STEM and reading exist 
(see Section 3.1). Furthermore, prevailing gender norms may discourage females from being too 
“aggressive”, which could influence gender responses to competition (Curriculum Development 
Division, 2016). These features demonstrate that multiple components of culture create a 
complex atmosphere that may affect gender dynamics in competition.  
2.2 Data Collection 
This experiment was conducted in public secondary schools in one school district in 
Selangor, the largest and most urban state in Malaysia. I invited co-educational secondary 
schools in this district to participate in this study, asking for one classroom period of time; five 
schools agreed to participate. All schools in this study sort students into classes within grades by 
prior achievement, a widespread practice in Malaysia, and have a minimum of five classes in 
Form 37 to ensure sufficient variation in competition levels. Three to five classes from Form 3 
were selected from each school to participate. The data collection was conducted over the span 
of one month, from July-August 2015. For a given school, the experiments in different 
classrooms8 were conducted during the same day and often at the same time. Not every 
                                                 
6 Malaysia’s oldest and most prestigious public university. 
7 9th grade equivalent; last year of lower secondary school and prior to academic track specializations. 
8 The experiment for one classroom at one school was conducted about three weeks after the rest of the classrooms 
at that school because of scheduling problems. 
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classroom in Form 3 in a school participated, experiments were often conducted at the same time 
within a school, and the bulk of the classroom experiments in the entire sample was conducted 
within one week, so there is little reason to worry that students knew about the experiment and 
strategized prior to participating. Students were paid two weeks after the experiment through 
sealed envelopes; there was no fixed participation fee and the average payout was RM10.269, 
with a minimum of RM0 and maximum of RM71.  
Four of the five schools provided administrative information including student gender 
and midterm grades (the most recent official grades). The study was conducted during regular 
classroom instruction time in eighteen classrooms10. Each school engaged in some form of 
classroom rankings such that the classrooms were ordered according to student achievement, 
prior to official academic tracking practices at the end of Form 3. Students are well aware of this 
ranking, similar to how students in other countries such as the U.S. are aware of being in 
advanced or remedial classes. For example, in three of the five schools, classes are named in 
alphabetical order from top to bottom class. The top class, bottom class, and one to three middle-
ranked classes in Form 3 of each school participated in this study. There were 562 secondary 
school students in Form 3 who participated in this study, but one student was dropped because 
there was no gender information available, leaving a sample of 561 students (290 males and 271 
females). In the sample, females make up 40% of the bottom classes, 48% of the middle classes 
and 54% of the top classes11. The analyses of the effect of facing a different level of competition 
(i.e., easier or harder competition) are limited to the sample of middle classes (266 students), 
which were oversampled for this purpose. 
The schools in this study represent over a fifth of the 24 public co-educational secondary 
schools12 in the district. Although they may not be representative of the country as a whole, the 
schools appear to be similar on average to Malaysian public secondary schools. The average 
classroom size in the schools in the sample is 35.28, similar to the national average lower 
                                                 
9 Currency was given in Malaysian Ringgit (MYR), which has a similar purchasing power to USD although the 
exchange rate was roughly 4 MYR:1 USD in summer 2015. 
10 One additional classroom was dropped due to technical problems. 
11 Post hoc ANOVA comparisons using the Sidak (p=0.036), Bonferroni (p=0.036), Scheffe (p=0.043) and Tukey 
(p=0.032) methods indicate that only the bottom and top classes have a statistically significant different proportion 
of females at the p<0.10 significance level. 
12 Most students in Malaysia attend co-educational schools. Wiseman (2008) finds that 14.67% of schools (indexed 
by 8th grade math classrooms) were sex-segregated, which was not statistically different from the international mean 
of 18.94%. 
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secondary classroom size of 34 (Ministry of Education Malaysia, 2014). Females make up 48% 
of the sample, similar to the national percentage of 50% (2015 data) in Form 3 (Ministry of 
Education Malaysia, 2015).  
 
2.3 Study design 
The objective of this experiment is to measure the rates of entering a competition when 
competing against classroom peers, and in a subsequent round, to measure differences in 
performance when forced to compete against students from another higher- or lower-ranked class 
in the same grade and school. 
The experiment has four rounds of tests with varying incentive structures followed by a 
survey, similar to the design first used in Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). The test instrument for 
each round was a five-minute math test with 40 double digit multiplication questions, which is a 
slightly longer and more difficult task than the one used by Niederle and Vesterlund, in order to 
enable more variance in scores due to an additional incentivized round in this study. This task 
was designed to measure the level of effort, not mathematical knowledge or attitudes. None of 
the questions repeat in the study and all numbers with zeroes were removed in order to keep the 
level of difficulty comparable across each test. There were no penalties for incorrect answers. 
Students were not allowed to use calculators but were given pieces of scratch paper to solve 
problems on. Directions about the specific incentive system of the round’s test were read out 
loud in Malay, the language of instruction, prior to each test. All documents were given in both 
English and Malay. Students were told not to speak during the duration of the study, and had to 
place their pens down and stand up when the end of each test was announced. Furthermore, 
students were informed that only 1 out of the 4 rounds of tests would be compensated, randomly 
chosen at the end of the session, in order to avoid hedging and to encourage each student to try 
his/her best during each round. Thus, at the end of each session, a representative from the class 
picked a ball numbered from 1-4 out of an opaque bag to choose which round was paid out for 
that entire class. 
Test 1 was scored according to a piece-rate incentive; for this test, students were paid 
RM0.50 per each correct answer. Test 2 was scored according to a winner-take-all tournament 
incentive (i.e. a competitive incentive). For this test, students were told they would be competing 
against 3 other randomly selected students (4 students per group) from their class. If they 
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obtained the highest score (i.e. first place), they received a payment of RM2 per each correct 
answer, but if they did not obtain the highest score, they received nothing13.  
Prior to Test 3, students were given the choice of how they wanted to be compensated for 
the third test. Each student chose between one of the prior two incentive schemes, marked the 
choice on a form, then inserted the form into an envelope. Students were informed prior to 
decision-making that if they chose the winner-take-all tournament incentive, they would compete 
against a new set of three randomly selected competitors’ scores from Test 2 so they could be 
competing against any of their classmates, not just those who chose the tournament incentive 
(see Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007). Test 3 proceeded after every student selected a choice and 
put away the form in an envelope.  
Prior to Test 4, students were given slips of paper that informed them which class they 
would be competing against in the fourth test. Thus, in the fourth round of the study, students 
were told they would be competing in a winner-take-all tournament, competing against three 
randomly selected students from the other class, under the same incentive structure as Test 2 but 
using only Test 4 scores. In each class, students were randomly assigned to one of two other 
classes in their grade (e.g. bottom or top class if the student were in a middle class); classes were 
referred to by their official school names with no explicit reference to positioning within the 
grade level. However, as described earlier, students are well aware of the implicit differences 
between classes. 
After Test 4, students completed a survey which included incentivized questions on 
levels of confidence and risk aversion, in addition to non-incentivized questions about their 
attitudes, opinions and family background. Students never received information about their 
scores during the experiment. Students could estimate how they had performed only after they 
were given their payments, a couple weeks after the experiment had been completed. 
3. Results 
3.1 Same-Class Competition Analyses 
The following section presents results from the first three rounds of the study, which 
replicates the design from Buser et al. (2014). First, I provide the descriptive results of the 
                                                 
13 Ties were awarded the same rank, and then skipped the next number of ranking (Stata’s egen rank, field option). 
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performance, competition choice, behavioral and other individual characteristics of students. I 
then present the regression results that confirm the gender gap in competition. 
There is no gender gap in performance for this multiplication task, whether students are 
under piece-rate or tournament incentive against their classroom peers. A table of descriptive 
characteristics shows the performance and competition choice prior to Test 3, when all students 
are under the same incentive structures (Table 1). Although it is not a focus of this paper, there is 
evidence that the sorting mechanism into classrooms by student prior achievement resulted in 
classes with overall differences in student performance, which is an important component of the 
analyses of performance against other classes. The average number of questions correct for the 
first test, under the piece-rate incentive, is 10.141 although this varies between 5.937 in the 
bottom classes to 12.432 in the top classes. The average number of questions correct for the 
second test, under the winner-takes-all tournament incentive, is significantly higher at 12.041, 
ranging from 7.746 in the bottom classes to 14.444 in the top classes14. Overall, females appear 
to outperform males on these first two tests, though these gender differences disappear when 
taking into account the class level and corresponding differences in gender distribution across 
class levels. Thus, it is established that there are no gender differences in performance under 
either of the incentives for this task.  
Furthermore, both genders increase performance under the competition incentive. The 
different incentive structures between Test 1 and Test 2 affects both genders; the average number 
of answers correct between Test 1 and Test 2 statistically significantly increases for both males 
and females (Appendix A-1). This increase could indicate learning with successive tests 
(discussed further in Section 3.2); however, a recent study finds that the order of piece-rate and 
tournament rounds does not significantly affect the difference in performance under the two 
incentives in a similar experiment (Wozniak et al., 2016). Therefore, we can interpret the 
positive increase as the response to competition. 
Unlike performance on the tests, there is a clear difference in the rates at which males and 
females choose competition, both overall and at each class level. Overall, less than a third of 
students (29.6%) choose competition for the incentive structure of Test 3. Females choose into 
                                                 
14 The numbers of correct answers for both Test 1 and Test 2 are different between all three class levels according to 
the analysis of variance comparisons, which indicates that student ability in these tasks has been appropriately sorted 
by class levels (ANOVA analyses available upon request). 
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competition at almost half the rate of males, with an average of 20.7% of females versus 37.9% 
of males choosing competition, with the greatest difference in the top classes (18.5% of females 
versus 46.8% of males).   
 The choice into competition for Test 3 does not appear to incentivize students to perform 
better than those who did not choose into competition for Test 3. There is no difference in the 
increase in number of correct answers from Test 2 to Test 3 for those who chose competition and 
those who chose piece-rate (Table 2). This can indicate either insensitivity to the choice, or poor 
measurement of effort (e.g. ceiling effects) on performance. Subsequent increased performance 
on Test 4 discussed in Section 3.2 implies that students did not respond to choice, rather than the 
task failing to measure changes in effort. 
Other factors such as confidence, risk-aversion, academic performance, attitudes and 
expectations towards math/science, and socio-economic status may be influential in students’ 
choice of competition. A summary of student behavioral and personal characteristics is shown in 
Table 3 (Appendix A-2 for detail). There are several characteristics that differ by gender. 
Males are more confident and over-confident than females in competitions against their 
own class. Confidence is measured by two questions on the survey, similar to what is used in 
Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). These questions ask what rank (1-first place to 4-last place) 
students think they had achieved for the two forced competition rounds, Test 2 (against own 
class) and Test 4 (against other class). Students received RM1 per correct answer for these 
questions. Overconfidence is defined as the difference between actual rank15 and guessed rank, 
with a range of -3 to 3. This measure provides the student’s level of confidence for the particular 
task rather than a more generalized measure (e.g. soliciting student perceptions about class rank). 
The average guessed rank of males against their own class is 2.441 versus 2.715 for females 
(p=0.001); thus, males guessed that they obtained a better rank than females guessed. After 
accounting for actual ranks, females are under-confident while males’ guessed ranks are closer to 
their actual ranks (slightly under-confident against their own class and slightly over-confident 
against another class).  
                                                 
15 Actual rank is constructed from 1000 simulations of random draws of 3 other students from the appropriate class 
against a given student’s score; the modal value was selected as actual rank. 
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It appears that males are more accurate in their rankings, although both males and 
females appear less confident about winning than other studies have found (e.g. Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2007). However, the male percentage is roughly in line with what was found in a 
sample of similarly-aged students (Buser et al., 2014). About 21% of males and 9% of females 
believe that they won the tournament in Test 2 (p<0.001), while 30% of males and 24% of 
females actually win the tournament, with no significant difference. 
Males are more risk-seeking than females according to both risk measures in this study. 
Risk preference is measured in two ways on the survey. First, students answered an incentivized 
question based on a modified question used by Eckel and Grossman (2002) that asked them to 
choose between an option with 100% certainty (RM2) or one of four 50/50 lottery options based 
on a flip of a coin at the end of the study: RM3 or RM1.50, RM4 or RM1, RM5 or RM0.50 or 
RM6 or RM0. The coin was flipped in front of the classroom at the end of the study and the 
individual’s choice was paid out with the rest of his/her earnings. Second, students answered a 
non-incentivized risk preference question taken from the 2004 wave of the German Socio-
Economic Panel Study following Dohmen and Falk (2011), who find that this question predicts 
incentivized lottery choices. The question is: How do you see yourself: Are you generally a 
person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks? Check ONE box on 
the scale, where the value 0 means: ‘unwilling to take risks’ and the value 10 means: ‘fully 
prepared to take risks’. Males choose a more risky lottery option and also choose a higher level 
of risk to describe themselves. In this sample, the correlation between these two measures is 
0.243 overall, 0.208 for males and 0.230 for females (p<0.001 in both cases). 
Females and males perform similarly on their school math midterm grades16; there is no 
gender difference (Appendix A-3 for detail). However, there is a significant female advantage 
for overall midterm grades: females have a 5 percentage point higher overall midterm grade than 
males (57.436 versus 52.414, p=0.005). Despite this academic context, the student survey 
responses show that male-favoring stereotypes exist for math and science and female-favoring 
stereotypes exist for reading, similar to Western stereotypes (Appendix A-4 for detail).  
Females and males have similar levels of enjoyment of math; 74.3% of males and 69.7% 
of females agree or strongly agree that they like math (no significant difference) although a 
                                                 
16 Administrative grade data was obtained from four out of the five schools. 
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higher percentage of males than females like science while a higher percentage of females than 
males like reading (p=0.015, p<0.001 respectively). In addition, a higher percentage of males 
believe they are good at math; almost half of males (47.2%) versus a little over a third of females 
(36.8%) agree or strongly agree that they are good at math (p=0.014). A similar pattern follows 
for science although it is reversed for reading; over three-quarters of females (77.2%) versus 
two-thirds of males (67.5%) think they are good at reading (p=0.010).  
The science and math fields are most prestigious; 71.4% of all students rate the Science 
track as the best academic track in upper secondary school, with no statistically significant 
gender differences. A marginally higher percentage of males than females think that they will 
end up in the Science track in the next academic year, 47.6% versus 40.6% (p=0.097). On 
average, students believe that boys are better at math and science while girls are better at 
reading; males tend to rate boys as better in each of these subjects (Appendix A-4 for detail). 
There do not appear to be gender differences in socioeconomic status (SES), using 
parental education as a proxy. On average, 45.1% of students’ fathers and 36.7% of students’ 
mothers hold at least bachelor’s degrees (Appendix A-5). 
Given that these variables may contribute to an individual’s decision to enter into 
competition, it is important to control for these variables when determining whether there is a 
gender difference in competitiveness; that is, choosing competition for Test 3. The measure of 
competitiveness in this paper is similar to the measure first used in Niederle and Vesterlund 
(2007). Student choice of whether to enter into competition or piece-rate compensation prior to 
Test 3, controlling for other variables, is used as the measure of competitiveness (choosing 
competition is used interchangeably with choosing the tournament incentive for Test 3). 
When controlling for only the score on the piece-rate test (Test 1) and the difference 
between the tournament and piece-rate scores (Test 2-Test 1), females are 17.4 percentage points 
less likely than males are to choose competition (Table 4, Model 1). When adding in the level of 
overconfidence, the difference decreases to 14.9 percentage points, which is different from the 
coefficient in Model 1 at the <0.001 level17 (Model 2). This difference remains largely stable 
when adding in both measures of risk preferences (Model 3), and is not significantly different 
                                                 
17 Comparisons of the coefficient for female use seemingly unrelated estimations with clustered standard errors (not 
exact standard errors from main analyses, since Stata’s suest command does not accept xtreg models). The 
coefficient for “Female” in Model 1 is significantly different from the coefficients in Models 2-4 at the p<0.10 level. 
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from Model 2. When student attitudes and SES are added, the gender gap is 13.9 percentage 
points, although none of the coefficients for these characteristics appear to influence competition 
entry (Model 4). Lastly, although one school did not provide midterm scores, the gender gap 
remains when including math and overall midterm grades in addition to all the other covariates 
(Model 5).  
Similar results hold for the previous models when this school is excluded from the 
analyses (Appendix A-6) or when session fixed effects are used instead of class fixed effects to 
account for simultaneous experimental sessions (Appendix A-7). Thus, the gender gap is still 
significant although the power from the reduced sample size is lower, and is very similar to the 
gap found in a similar age sample of ninth-grade students in the Netherlands, 11.7 percentage 
points (Buser et al., 2014). 
 Secondary students in Malaysia show the standard gender gap in choosing competition 
that has been demonstrated in many different contexts. When only controlling for previous 
performance, the gender gap is 17.4 percentage points. The gender gap is reduced a total of about 
20% when controlling for confidence, risk preferences, student attitudes about math and 
socioeconomic status, but females are still 13.9 percentage points less likely than males to 
choose competition (p<0.05). 
 
3.2 Other-Class Competition Analysis 
 
The previous analysis confirms that the standard gender gap in choosing into math 
competition exists for this sample of secondary school students. This section focuses on the 
novel contribution of this paper: how students react to different levels of competition. I present 
several descriptive findings of the difference in performance when facing different competitors. I 
then present the experimental results in addition to exploring heterogeneity in these results and 
whether changes in questions answered or accuracy led to these results.  
The sample for the following analyses is restricted to the middle-ranked (middle) classes 
so that there are both easier (bottom class) and harder (top class) competitors. There are 266 
students in 8 middle classes (137 male and 129 female), which represents a little less than half 
the number of students in the original sample. As described in Section 2.3, students in the middle 
classes were randomized to compete against either the top ranked class or the bottom ranked 
class in the same grade and school, although classes were only named by their official titles as to 
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not directly prime students to the level of their competitors. Students received a slip of paper 
informing them which class their competitors would come from, and were told to put the slip of 
paper in an envelope and not talk so that treatment assignments remained concealed.  
As in the overall sample, there is a general upward trend in the number of correct answers 
in successive tests, which suggests that learning18 could play a role in the observed scores (Table 
5). This brings up concerns about whether the observed scores reflect learning or ability rather 
than the effort put into the task. The randomization should alleviate these concerns for this last 
round, unless learning or ability is not balanced within genders across treatment groups. The 
randomization produced balanced groups competing against higher and lower competitors across 
all observable baseline characteristics (gender, math midterm score and overall midterm score). 
In addition, most student characteristics measured prior to treatment are balanced across groups, 
including scores on Test 2, Test 3, the difference between Test 2 and Test 1, and the competition 
choice. Treatment assignment predicts the score on Test 1 at the 10% significance level, although 
there is no significant correlation between treatment and Test 1 score within gender (Appendix 
A-8). The following analyses control for Test 1 score, difference between Test 1 and Test 2 
score, and competition choice as robustness checks. 
Although the upward trend in scores on successive tests is clear in the treatment against 
the bottom class, it is less apparent for those who competed against the top class. However, the 
incentives between the third and fourth test vary by student choice thus it is most relevant to 
compare results from Test 4 against Test 2.  
In the following analyses, the primary variable of interest is the difference between 
performance in Test 2 and Test 4. Similar variables are constructed for the difference between 
total number of questions answered and the difference in accuracy of answers, which are used to 
explore the main results. Thus, a student’s performance against another class (Test 4) is 
compared against performance against a student’s own class (Test 2). This within-subject design 
                                                 
18 A limitation of this study is the difficulty in separating out learning effects and response to incentives, given that 
the order of the rounds remained constant in order to replicate the Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) experiment to 
determine gender differences in competition. Cotton and colleagues show that repeated competition eliminates the 
gender gap in performance in their study (Cotton et al., 2013). The results from the current study show some 
indication that genders may perform differently in successive competitions. The average scores increase from Test 1 
to Test 2 for both genders, for only females from Test 2 to Test 3, and then do not increase from Test 3 to Test 4 for 
either gender. However, there is no indication that males lower their performance during successive rounds, unlike 
what Cotton and colleagues find.  
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allows us to see the effect of a different level of competitor using each subject’s baseline value 
(i.e. performance on Test 2). The average value of the difference in the number of correct 
answers from Test 2 to Test 4 is 1.34 with a standard deviation of 2.90 and a range of -7 to 10. 
As Figure 1 shows, there is no gender difference in the change in performance when the 
competitors are from the bottom class. Both genders perform about 1.5 questions better. 
However, when matched against competitors from the top class, females increase the number of 
correct answers by significantly more than males, 1.806 correct answers compared to 0.521 
correct answers (Appendix A-9, p=0.018).  
Since treatment is randomized within class, the following equation can be used to 
determine the effect of the treatment. 
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑗  =  Γ𝑗 +  𝛽1𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽3(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒)𝑖𝑗 + 𝜃Χij + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
where: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 is the difference in number of correct answers between other and own class (Test 4 - Test 2) 
for student i in class j 
Γ𝑗 is the class fixed effects 
Treatment is 1 if assigned to the top class and 0 if assigned to the bottom class for student i in 
class j 
Female is 1 if female and 0 if male for student i in class j 
Treatment * Female is 1 if student i in class j is assigned to the top class and is female; 0 
otherwise. This represents the gender difference in the effect of treatment on the difference of 
performance between other and own class 
Χij is a vector of student attributes 
The regressions in Table 6 show the effects of competing against the top class 
(competition against bottom class as reference group), relative to competing against own class. 
Since the treatments were randomly assigned, the estimates of the effect of the treatment can be 
directly interpreted. Baseline covariates are included in subsequent models, which lowers the 
precision of the estimates (Columns 2-3). The regressions are also performed separately for 
males (Columns 4-6) and females (Columns 7-9). 
 The effect of facing the top class versus the bottom class is about one question less,  
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-0.999 (p<0.05) (Table 6, Column 1). However, the interaction effect of being female and facing 
the top class is positive and similar in magnitude to this negative effect, 1.155 (p<0.10). When 
adding in baseline variables including Test 1 performance, response to competition incentive 
(difference in Test 1 and Test 2 performance), and competition choice, the pattern remains 
similar; there is a stable negative main effect although precision decreases so that the female 
interaction effect is not statistically significantly different from zero (Table 6, Column 3).  
The gender difference in response to harder competition is clearer when examining the 
regression results separately by gender (Table 6, Columns 4-9). The effect of facing the top class 
instead of the bottom class is consistently negative and close to 1 question for males after 
controlling for behavior and performance from prior rounds19, ranging from -0.966 to -0.869 
(Table 6, Columns 4-6). On the other hand, females do not seem affected by facing the top class 
as opposed to the bottom class; the effect is not statistically different from zero (Table 6, 
Columns 7-9). These findings indicate that males are negatively affected by facing a difficult 
competitor while females are not. Qualitatively similar results hold when the whole sample of 
students is included and treatment is defined as competing against any higher class (Appendix A-
10), session fixed effects are used (Appendix A-11) or absolute score on Test 4 is used 
controlling for Test 2 performance and other variables (Appendix A-12). Males perform worse 
when competing against the top class rather than the bottom class, even after controlling for prior 
performance and competitive behavior, while there is no evidence that females perform 
differently according to the level of their competitors. 
To explore these results, I examine heterogeneity in the sample in addition to whether the 
effects are due to differential numbers of questions answered or a change in the accuracy of 
answers. 
An important characteristic of this sample is the variance in performance both within 
schools (e.g. average scores in middle classes compared to top classes) and across schools. All 
previous results include class fixed effects, which help capture this heterogeneity. However, it is 
also instructive to view these results in a more easily comparable manner such as the chance of 
winning against the top class. The chance of winning against the top class conditional on the 
number of correct answers varies by school; for example, with 18 correct answers, a student in a 
                                                 
19 When the baseline variables are added in models 3, 6 and 9, the difference between Test 1 and Test 2 performance 
(T-PR) shows a consistently large negative coefficient, which could possibly be due to ceiling effects. 
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middle class at School 4 has an 83% chance of winning, while a student in a middle class at 
School 5 has a 9% chance of winning (Table 7). When the chances of winning are used as 
controls instead of the numbers of answers correct, the effects of facing harder competition 
remain negative for males and null for females (Appendix A-13). 
These effects of facing more difficult competitors appear to differ along the distribution 
of baseline performance by gender. For males, the difference between Test 2 and Test 4 score is 
greatest at the best and worst quintiles of the baseline (Test 1) performance distribution (Figure 
2). Males at the best and worst quintiles who face the top class perform about two questions 
worse than males who face the bottom class. Females in the top two quintiles perform similarly 
when facing either the top or bottom class, although females in the bottom two quintiles who 
face the top class appear to perform a little better than those who face the bottom class. Overall, 
it appears that males from the top and bottom of the performance distributions respond most to 
the level of competition. 
The change in performance from Test 2 to Test 4 could be due to a combination of the 
quantity and accuracy of answered questions. For example, individuals can obtain a higher score 
by answering more questions with the same (or lower) level of accuracy or by answering the 
same number (or fewer) of questions with higher accuracy. It appears that competitor difficulty 
has no effect on the number of questions answered; there is a negative effect for males that is not 
significant after controlling for prior number of questions answered and competitive behavior 
(Table 8). However, males but not females are less accurate when facing more difficult 
competitors; the difference between females and males when facing harder competition is about 
5 percentage points and significant at the 5% level (Table 9, column 3). After controlling for 
prior accuracy and competitive behavior, the accuracy of males who face harder competitors is a 
little over 3 percentage points (significant at the 10% level) less than the accuracy of males who 
face easier competitors (Table 9, column 6). Thus, it appears that males change the quality 
(accuracy) of performance rather than the quantity of effort against more difficult competition. 
4 Discussion 
This study shows the robustness of the gender gap in competition. Overall, females 
choose into competition at about half the rate of males—20.7% versus 37.9%. After controlling 
for student performance, confidence, risk preferences, and other student characteristics, females 
still have a 13.9 percentage point lower probability of choosing into competition less than males. 
20 
 
This gender gap is very similar to what is found in the Netherlands with a similar age group and 
experiment protocol, although the overall rates of competition are lower in Malaysia.  
There is another gender gap that emerges when facing different levels of competitors. 
The performance of females is not affected by facing harder competitors. However, males 
perform almost one question worse when facing competitors from the top class (about one-third 
of a standard deviation) than when competing against the bottom class. It appears that accuracy 
decreases for males when facing the top class compared to the bottom class. There may be 
several explanations for the gender difference in performance against harder competitors, such as 
the gender composition of groups, differential expectations when facing different classes or 
changes in the chance of winning or expected earnings.  
One possible explanation for these results may be the gender composition of the 
competitor groups. Existing research indicates that the gender composition of competitors can 
affect performance in competitions (Booth and Nolen, 2012; De Paola et al., 2015; Gneezy et al., 
2003; Kuhnen and Tymula, 2011). Thus, the perceived gender composition of the competitors 
could also play a role in these results. As noted in Section 2.2, there is a higher proportion of 
females in the top classes than in the middle or bottom classes, although the difference is not 
statistically significant between the top and middle classes, which is the relevant comparison in 
these analyses. The range in female composition of the top class across the five schools in the 
study is reasonably small, from 48.48% to 60.71%. These factors make it unlikely that the 
female composition of the top classes affected results. 
These results could also be explained by different expectations between genders when 
competing against harder or easier competition, and a corresponding differential change in effort. 
For example, Kuhnen and Tymula (2011) use gender composition of the group as a proxy for 
perceived difficulty of competitor and find that females have lower output, worse expected rank 
and worse actual rank with more males in their group while males are not affected by the gender 
composition of the group. However, gender composition of the group may be an inappropriate 
proxy for perceived difficulty of competitors. It is worth noting that they observe that males 
expect better rankings than females (similar to this study) yet males also outperform females 
(different from this study).  
I use a similar task but more clearly designated groups of easier or harder competitors 
and find that expectations of males rather than that of females appear to be affected. There are no 
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gender differences in the actual rankings in either treatment condition, although both genders 
guess a better rank when competing against the bottom class (Table 10). These rankings also 
confirm that the difficulty levels of competitors are appropriately categorized; students in the 
sample have a 55% chance of winning the tournament against the bottom class and a 16% chance 
of winning against the top class, with no gender difference. However, males guess they are a 
better rank than females do and are more overconfident when facing the bottom class (p-values 
0.019 and 0.061, respectively). There are no gender differences in guessed rank or 
overconfidence when facing the top class, although males are slightly overconfident and females 
are under-confident. Since baseline measures of confidence against different classes were not 
elicited in this study in order to prevent priming, it is not possible to distinguish whether the 
treatment of facing more difficult competition changed male and female priors about their 
performance differentially. Nevertheless, these ex-post elicited measures of confidence could 
indicate a possible mechanism difference between genders; that is, males may lower 
performance because they expect to do worse against harder competition (on par with females’ 
confidence), relative to their confidence against easier competition (more confident than 
females).  
Finally, there is a negative effect on the chance of winning (Table 11) and expected 
earnings (Table 12) when facing harder competition for both females and males. The relatively 
lower performance of males when facing harder competition does not appear to result in a lower 
chance of winning or decreased expected earnings for males. Thus, the lower performance of 
males may reflect greater efficiency (i.e. lower performance for the same financial outcomes). 
The gender difference in performance under more difficult competition is somewhat 
surprising, given findings from previous literature which generally show an equal response if not 
female disadvantage when encountering difficult competition. For example, Eriksson et al. 
(2009) finds that relative information does not affect performance, Gill and Prowse (2014) finds 
that both genders lower performance after a loss and Buser (2016) finds that females lower their 
performance after a loss but males do not.  
However, this study design does not depend on explicit information, as previous studies 
have used, but a more realistic yet less certain competitive situation. The experiment exploited 
pre-existing differences in levels of competitors without an explicit message about relative 
position, which could affect the dynamics in competition. There is suggestive evidence that 
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males may have lowered expectations when facing harder competition, although the gender gap 
in the effect of facing harder competition on performance does not appear to extend to a gender 
difference in the chance of winning or expected earnings. 
 
5 Conclusion 
This paper presents experimental evidence that females and males have different 
reactions to more difficult competitors—males lower their performance while females’ 
performance does not change. In addition, it appears that standard gender differences in 
competitive behavior apply even within a STEM context with more female participation. Given 
the similar gender gaps in competition choice, it is reasonable to believe that the new findings 
about reacting to harder competition apply in broader contexts. 
The results from this study confirm the gender gap in choosing into competition in a math 
task similar to those that have been linked to future educational choices. Although several 
previous studies have found that females perform worse than males in competition, the current 
study adds to the body of literature that finds no gender difference in competitive performance. 
Furthermore, the within-subject study design shows a gender difference in the response to harder 
or easier competition.  
These findings have implications for policies designed to attract females into more 
competitive environments. Existing research clearly indicates that, when given a choice, females 
choose into competition less than males do. There are many situations in which people face 
competition choices, such as which courses to take in school or which jobs to apply for. Early 
decisions could have lasting consequences; for example, there may be prerequisite courses for 
certain majors which are required to pursue certain occupations (e.g. advanced math/science 
courses required for engineering degrees to become an engineer). If females differentially 
decline to enter into competition early, gender gaps may widen over time as fewer opportunities 
remain open.  
However, it appears that females may not be negatively affected by the level of 
competition once they are in a more competitive situation. Thus, if females do not perform worse 
in more competitive environments even when they do not choose into these environments, 
perhaps policies can be designed to compel people into more difficult competitive environments. 
For example, schools could require more advanced STEM courses or companies could provide 
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mandatory leadership programs, which would require females who may not otherwise choose 
those programs to participate in them. Then, they may thrive in the more competitive 
environment. On the other hand, it is important to ensure that males do not perform worse in 
these more demanding situations where there could be negative outcomes from lowered 
performance. The results of this study are found in a sample of students in middle-ranked classes 
with no gender differences in performance, thus these proposed policies may not apply among 
high or low performance individuals or when gender differences in performance exist. These 
policies also do not address other barriers such as chilly climates that females face in competitive 
environments.  
Future research could look at the generalizability of and possible mechanisms underlying 
the results. This study was conducted among secondary students in middle-ranked classes in an 
Asian country; it would be illuminating to see whether the results hold among different ages, 
performance levels or cultural contexts. In addition to addressing generalizability, future studies 
can examine more deeply the potential mechanisms for these results, such as a differential 
change in expectations when facing different levels of competition. Other possibilities from the 
psychology literature could be differences in persistence or grit; for example, females may be 
grittier than males in learning environments. Thus, even if females would not choose more 
competitive environments, they could persist and succeed in them. Understanding these 
mechanisms could help design policies that could result in greater participation and performance 
in environments with more difficult competition. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of number of correct answers and competition choice, by class level 
  
Variable Class level Overall Male Female Diff p-value 
Test 1 (Piece-Rate) Overall 10.141 9.693 10.620 -0.927 0.040 
 Bottom 5.937 5.908 5.980 -0.072 0.948 
 Middle 10.677 10.307 11.070 -0.763 0.173 
 Top 12.432 12.338 12.511 -0.173 0.847 
Test 2 (Tournament) Overall 12.041 11.710 12.395 -0.684 0.082 
 Bottom 7.746 7.789 7.680 0.109 0.785 
 Middle 12.549 12.482 12.620 -0.138 0.650 
 Top 14.444 14.208 14.641 -0.434 0.354 
T-PR Overall 1.898 2.014 1.770 0.239 0.591 
 Bottom 1.810 1.882 1.700 0.182 0.469 
 Middle 1.872 2.175 1.550 0.625 0.208 
 Top 2.006 1.857 2.13 -0.273 0.365 
Competition choice Overall 0.296 0.379 0.207 0.173 <0.001 
 Bottom 0.325 0.395 0.220 0.175 0.041 
 Middle 0.271 0.321 0.217 0.104 0.057 
  Top 0.314 0.468 0.185 0.283 <0.001 
Number of observations are from the whole sample: 561 overall, with 290 males and 271 females overall. The 
gender breakdown is: 76 males and 50 females in the bottom classes; 137 males and 129 females in the middle 
classes; 77 males and 92 females in the top classes. T-PR is the difference between number correct on the 
tournament (Test 2) versus piece-rate test (Test 1). Competition choice is the proportion that chose the 
tournament rather than the piece-rate incentive. P-values are from Mann-Whitney U tests. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Change in number of correct answers between Test 2 and Test 3  
 
 Overall 
Chose 
Piece-rate 
Chose 
Competition 
    
 Mean N Mean N Mean N Diff p-value 
Overall 0.720 561 0.681 395 0.813 166 -0.132 0.518 
Male 0.638 290 0.600 180 0.700 110 -0.100 0.771 
Female  0.808 271 0.749 215 1.036 56 -0.287 0.385 
Differences are calculated by student (Test 3-Test 2). P-values are from Mann-Whitney U tests. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of student characteristics 
 Overall Male Female   
Variable Mean N Mean N Mean N Diff p-value 
Confidence        
Guessed Rank Test 2 2.573 560 2.441 290 2.715 270 -0.273 0.001 
Guessed Rank Test 4 2.455 560 2.360 289 2.557 271 -0.197 0.028 
Overconfidence Test 2  -0.221 560 -0.097 290 -0.356 270 0.259 0.016 
Overconfidence Test 4 -0.136 560 0.042 289 -0.325 271 0.366 <0.001 
Risk        
 
Incentivized risk scale  
(1-5; 5 most risky) 
2.588 561 3.103 290 2.037 271 1.067 <0.001 
Non-incentivized risk scale  
(0-10; 10 most risky) 
6.161 559 6.410 288 5.897 271 0.513 0.001 
Midterm scores        
Math 49.842 463 49.457 230 50.223 233 -0.767 0.852 
Overall GPA 54.936 432 52.414 215 57.436 217 -5.022 0.005 
Attitudes and Beliefs       
Like Math 0.721 555 0.743 284 0.697 271 0.046 0.232 
Like Science 0.770 556 0.812 287 0.725 269 0.087 0.015 
Like Reading 0.752 537 0.647 275 0.863 262 -0.215 <0.001 
Good at Math 0.422 552 0.472 286 0.368 266 0.104 0.014 
Good at Science 0.410 554 0.455 286 0.362 268 0.093 0.027 
Good at Reading 0.722 554 0.675 286 0.772 268 -0.098 0.010 
Rank Science 1 0.714 532 0.722 270 0.706 262 0.016 0.681 
Guess Science Stream 0.442 559 0.476 288 0.406 271 0.070 0.097 
Stereotype views         
Gender better at math (-1 to 1) -0.220 549 -0.270 282 -0.169 267 -0.101 0.053 
Gender better at science (-1 to 1) -0.160 550 -0.236 284 -0.079 266 -0.157 0.003 
Gender better at reading (-1 to 1) 0.376 553 0.320 284 0.435 269 -0.115 0.048 
Socioeconomic status       
Father is college grad 0.451 552 0.483 286 0.417 266 0.065 0.124 
Mother is college grad 0.367 551 0.384 284 0.348 267 0.035 0.388 
Guess Rank ranges from 1-4 (1 is the best rank and 4 is the worst rank). Overconfidence is calculated as Actual-Guessed rank 
(actual rank based on modal rank in 1000 simulations). Midterm scores are available for 4 schools, and are on a scale of 0-
100. Attitudes and beliefs are based on dichotomized variables where 1=yes/agree and 0=no/disagree, except for “Gender 
better at” questions which are coded -1 (Boys are better) 0 (Both are equally as good) and 1 (Girls are better). Socioeconomic 
status are dichotomized variables for each parent holding at least a bachelor's degree. P-values are from Mann-Whitney U 
tests. 
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Table 4. Models for tournament entry (Competitiveness) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Female -0.174** -0.149** -0.146** -0.139** -0.150* 
 (0.0475) (0.0466) (0.0439) (0.0473) (0.0557) 
Num. Correct-Test 1 0.0182** 0.0261*** 0.0238*** 0.0254** 0.0282** 
 (0.00521) (0.00595) (0.00594) (0.00654) (0.00825) 
T-PR 0.00828 0.0182* 0.0151* 0.0192** 0.0189* 
 (0.00779) (0.00680) (0.00620) (0.00607) (0.00746) 
Overconfidence Test 2  0.0601** 0.0507* 0.0532* 0.0666* 
  (0.0175) (0.0177) (0.0185) (0.0225) 
Nonincentivized risk    0.0249+ 0.0245* 0.0373** 
   (0.0122) (0.0111) (0.0109) 
Incentivized risk   -0.00380 -0.00342 -0.0196* 
   (0.0120) (0.0130) (0.00900) 
Math stereotype    -0.0133 -0.0356 
    (0.0384) (0.0455) 
Likes math    0.00535 -0.00998 
    (0.0368) (0.0500) 
Thinks is good at math    -0.00990 -0.0186 
    (0.0441) (0.0583) 
Expects science stream    0.0349 0.0741 
    (0.0423) (0.0425) 
Father is college grad    -0.0327 -0.0563 
    (0.0599) (0.0554) 
Mother is college grad    0.00869 -0.0173 
    (0.0588) (0.0698) 
Midterm math score     -0.000150 
     (0.00204) 
Midterm overall score     -0.00490 
     (0.00420) 
Observations 561 560 558 524 409 
All models provide OLS linear probability results that include class fixed effects. T-PR is the difference between 
number correct on the tournament (Test 2) versus piece-rate test (Test 1). Overconfidence Test 2 is measured as 
the difference between Actual and Guessed rank on Test 2. Nonincentivized risk is a scale from 0-10 (10 is most 
risky). Incentivized risk is the choice between a certain option or set of lotteries, ranging a total of 1-5 (5 is most 
risky). Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. Significance levels are set at + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** 
p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
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Table 5. Number of correct answers, by treatment condition 
 
    Treatment Condition   
  Overall Bottom Class Top Class   
  Mean N Mean N Mean N Diff p-value  
Overall Test 1 10.677 266 10.977 133 10.376 133 0.602 0.228 
 Test 2 12.549 266 12.714 133 12.383 133 0.331 0.567 
 Test 3 13.429 266 13.669 133 13.188 133 0.481 0.387 
 Test 4 13.891 266 14.286 133 13.496 133 0.789 0.253 
Males Test 1 10.307 137 10.848 66 9.803 71 1.046 0.134 
 Test 2 12.482 137 12.636 66 12.338 71 0.298 0.725 
 Test 3 13.263 137 13.652 66 12.901 71 0.750 0.436 
 Test 4 13.467 137 14.136 66 12.845 71 1.291 0.270 
Females Test 1 11.070 129 11.104 67 11.032 62 0.072 0.870 
 Test 2 12.620 129 12.791 67 12.435 62 0.356 0.623 
 Test 3 13.605 129 13.687 67 13.516 62 0.170 0.631 
 Test 4 14.341 129 14.433 67 14.242 62 0.191 0.627 
Analyses are limited to the sample of students in the middle classes. P-values are from Mann-Whitney U tests. 
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Table 6. Change in number of correct answers between Test 2 and Test 4 due to level of competition 
 All Male Female 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Versus top class -0.999* -1.014* -0.797+ -0.966* -0.979* -0.869+ 0.181 0.179 0.059 
 (0.330) (0.335) (0.420) (0.315) (0.314) (0.390) (0.603) (0.622) (0.626) 
Female 0.0136 -0.0378 -0.103       
 (0.571) (0.583) (0.619)       
Female* top class 1.155+ 1.168 0.844       
 (0.601) (0.623) (0.760)       
Competition  -0.447 -0.302  -0.378 -0.231  -0.722 -0.598 
  (0.258) (0.245)  (0.418) (0.362)  (0.563) (0.583) 
Test 1   -0.0478   -0.0823+   0.0164 
   (0.0347)   (0.0375)   (0.0492) 
T-PR   -0.407***   -0.293**   -0.485*** 
   (0.0456)   (0.0693)   (0.0794) 
Observations 266 266 266 137 137 137 129 129 129 
Analyses are limited to the sample of students in the middle classes. All models provide OLS linear probability results 
that include class fixed effects. Competition is the competition choice prior to Round 3. Test 1 is the number of correct 
answers on Test 1 (Piece-Rate). T-PR is the difference between number correct on the tournament (Test 2) versus piece-
rate test (Test 1). Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. Significance levels are set at: + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** 
p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
Table 7. Chance of winning in Test 4 against top class, by school 
Questions 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 25 29 
School 1 0.2 0.6 1.2 1.4 5.7 10.8 12.4 17.5 30.5 50.1 71.3 91.5 93.2 - - - 
School 2 0.5 0.5 1 1.1 3.1 - 20.3 23.4 39.1 55.6 - - 81.5 - - - 
School 3 0.3 0.3 - - - 3.4 - - 24.5 - 53.8 - - - - - 
School 4 1.7 - 21.5 - - 53 66.7 - 83.1 - - - - - - - 
School 5 0 0 0 0.8 1 2.4 3 7 9.4 13.7 23.7 39.4 - 52.6 61.8 100 
Analyses only include the sample of students in the middle classes who face the top class. The chance of winning in 
Test 4 is the chance of getting 1st place in a group of 4 total competitors: the individual and 3 competitors from the 
top class of the same school (percentages are obtained by simulating 1,000 random draws of groups of 3 competitors 
from the top class for each individual). 
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Table 8. Change in number of answered questions between Test 2 and Test 4 due to level of 
competition 
 All Male Female 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Versus top class -0.645* -0.637* -0.465 -0.616* -0.610* -0.448 -0.146 -0.146 -0.234 
 (0.238) (0.238) (0.254) (0.250) (0.252) (0.256) (0.423) (0.421) (0.455) 
Female 0.0623 0.0879 0.0853       
 (0.369) (0.373) (0.400)       
Female* top class 0.474 0.468 0.212       
 (0.404) (0.393) (0.539)       
Competition  0.223 0.174  0.182 0.165  0.268 0.0602 
  (0.224) (0.210)  (0.173) (0.226)  (0.480) (0.461) 
Test 1   0.0287   -0.0116   0.0957* 
   (0.0315)   (0.0361)   (0.0377) 
T-PR   -0.235***   -0.296***   -0.144+ 
   (0.0359)   (0.0423)   (0.0701) 
Observations 266 266 266 137 137 137 129 129 129 
Analyses are limited to the sample of students in the middle classes. All models provide OLS linear probability results 
that include class fixed effects. Competition is the competition choice prior to Round 3. Test 1 is the number of total 
(incorrect + correct) answers on Test 1 (Piece-Rate). T-PR is the difference between number of total answers on the 
tournament (Test 2) versus piece-rate test (Test 1). Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. Significance 
levels are set at: + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
 
Table 9. Change in accuracy between Test 2 and Test 4 due to level of competition 
 All Male Female 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Versus top class -0.0649 -0.0657 -0.0422* -0.0646+ -0.0647+ -0.0342+ 0.0196 0.0195 0.00814 
 (0.0347) (0.0349) (0.0154) (0.0339) (0.0336) (0.0148) (0.0207) (0.0225) (0.0158) 
Female -0.0132 -0.0159 -0.0129       
 (0.0328) (0.0327) (0.0218)       
Female* top class 0.0840+ 0.0847+ 0.0505*       
 (0.0419) (0.0425) (0.0192)       
Competition  -0.0233 -0.0199  -0.00431 -0.0134  -0.0616* -0.0372+ 
  (0.0245) (0.0147)  (0.0387) (0.0272)  (0.0220) (0.0192) 
Test 1   -0.520***   -0.591***   -0.566*** 
   (0.0497)   (0.0984)   (0.0701) 
T-PR   -0.875***   -1.020***   -0.785*** 
   (0.0947)   (0.162)   (0.0666) 
Observations 266 266 266 137 137 137 129 129 129 
Analyses are limited to the sample of students in the middle classes. All models provide OLS linear probability results 
that include class fixed effects. Competition is the competition choice prior to Round 3. Test 1 is the percentage of 
correct answers on Test 1 (Piece-Rate). T-PR is the difference between percentages of correct answers on the tournament 
(Test 2) versus piece-rate test (Test 1). Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. Significance levels are set at: 
+ p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
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Table 10. Confidence on Test 4 by treatment and gender 
  Overall Male Female   
Variable Treatment Mean N Mean N Mean N Diff p-value  
Actual Rank Bottom class 1.541 133 1.500 66 1.582 67 -0.082 0.830 
 Top class 2.932 133 2.944 71 2.919 62 0.024 0.761 
Guessed Rank  Bottom class 1.962 133 1.758 66 2.164 67 -0.407 0.019 
 Top class 3.000 133 2.930 71 3.081 62 -0.151 0.685 
Overconfidence Bottom class -0.421 133 -0.258 66 -0.582 67 0.325 0.061 
 Top class -0.068 133 0.014 71 -0.161 62 0.175 0.579 
Probability of win Bottom class 55.0 133 56.1 66 54.0 67 2.16 0.601 
 Top class 15.8 133 15.4 71 16.2 62 -0.77 0.474 
Analyses are limited to the sample of students in the middle classes. Actual rank is based on modal rank on Test 4 
based on 1000 simulations. Guessed rank is from the survey question asking students to guess their rank. 
Overconfidence is the difference between Actual and Guessed rank. Probability of win is calculated as the 
percentage of wins (i.e. rank 1) based on the 1,000 simulations. P-values are from Mann-Whitney U tests. 
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Table 11. Change in chance of winning Test 4 due to level of competition 
 All Male Female 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Versus top class -40.05*** -39.86*** -36.69** -39.71*** -39.57*** -37.33*** -38.54*** -38.52*** -37.64*** 
 (5.087) (5.168) (6.914) (5.105) (5.153) (6.759) (5.871) (5.721) (4.387) 
Female -1.425 -0.776 -0.660       
 (4.320) (4.377) (4.076)       
Female* top class 1.247 1.088 -1.096       
 (4.680) (4.698) (5.154)       
Competition  5.652* -3.528  4.093 -2.634  8.357 -5.595 
  (2.108) (2.079)  (4.977) (2.147)  (4.794) (7.064) 
Test 1   4.470***   4.059***   5.306*** 
   (0.263)   (0.350)   (0.441) 
T-PR   2.153***   2.791**   1.816* 
   (0.316)   (0.681)   (0.625) 
Observations 266 266 266 137 137 137 129 129 129 
Analyses are limited to the sample of students in the middle classes. All models provide OLS linear probability 
results that include class fixed effects. The chance of winning in Test 4 is the chance of getting 1st place in a group 
of 4 total competitors: the individual and 3 competitors from the other class (percentages are obtained by simulating 
1,000 random draws of groups of 3 competitors for each individual, by class). Competition is the competition choice 
prior to Round 3. Test 1 is the number of correct answers on Test 1 (Piece-Rate). T-PR is the difference between 
number correct on the tournament (Test 2) versus piece-rate test (Test 1). Robust standard errors are provided in 
parentheses. Significance levels are set at: + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
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Table 12. Change in expected earnings in Test 4 due to level of competition 
 All Male Female 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Versus top class -12.01*** -11.91*** -10.47** -11.84*** -11.76*** -10.72** -12.04*** -12.03*** -11.57*** 
 (1.573) (1.632) (2.236) (1.560) (1.584) (2.127) (2.153) (2.118) (1.393) 
Female -0.181 0.169 0.245       
 (1.913) (1.921) (1.791)       
Female* top class -0.151 -0.236 -1.168       
 (2.175) (2.161) (2.210)       
Competition  3.054* -1.344  2.424 -0.812  4.260* -2.409 
  (1.080) (0.963)  (2.362) (1.159)  (1.357) (2.857) 
Test 1   2.135***   1.951***   2.515*** 
   (0.215)   (0.243)   (0.320) 
T-PR   1.151**   1.401*   1.029* 
   (0.274)   (0.419)   (0.340) 
Observations 266 266 266 137 137 137 129 129 129 
Analyses are limited to the sample of students in the middle classes. All models provide OLS linear probability 
results that include class fixed effects. The expected earnings in Test 4 is the chance of getting 1st place in the group 
of 4 multiplied by 2 (percentages are obtained by simulating 1,000 random draws of groups of 3 competitors for 
each individual, by class). Competition is the competition choice prior to Round 3. Test 1 is the number of correct 
answers on Test 1 (Piece-Rate). T-PR is the difference between number correct on the tournament (Test 2) versus 
piece-rate test (Test 1). Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. Significance levels are set at: + p<0.10 * 
p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
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Figure 1: Change in number of correct answers between Test 2 and Test 4, by treatment and 
gender 
  
 
Significance levels are set at: + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Change in number of correct answers between Test 2 and Test 4, by treatment and 
gender and initial performance quintile 
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A-1. Average difference in number of correct answers between tests  
  Overall Male Female 
  
Class 
level Diff p-value Diff p-value Diff p-value 
Test 1 to Test 2 All 1.900 <0.001 2.017 <0.001 1.775 <0.001 
 Bottom 1.810 0.012 1.882 0.043 1.700 0.142 
 Middle 1.872 <0.001 2.175 0.001 1.550 0.003 
 Top 2.012 <0.001 1.87 0.037 2.130 0.002 
Test 2 to Test 3 All 0.720 0.010 0.638 0.153 0.808 0.026 
 Bottom 0.214 0.747 0.105 0.945 0.38 0.734 
 Middle 0.880 0.017 0.781 0.204 0.984 0.031 
 Top 0.846 0.055 0.909 0.217 0.793 0.148 
Test 3 to Test 4 All 0.451 0.203 0.345 0.569 0.565 0.163 
 Bottom 0.492 0.657 0.539 0.637 0.42 0.895 
 Middle 0.462 0.308 0.204 0.783 0.736 0.192 
 Top 0.402 0.483 0.403 0.751 0.402 0.409 
Test 2 to Test 4 All 1.171 <0.001 0.983 0.045 1.373 0.001 
 Bottom 0.706 0.451 0.645 0.565 0.800 0.599 
 Middle 1.342 0.001 0.985 0.114 1.721 0.002 
  Top 1.249 0.012 1.312 0.147 1.196 0.029 
This table reports the differences in number correct. Number of observations are from the whole sample: 561 
overall, with 290 males and 271 females overall. The gender breakdown is: 76 males and 50 females in the bottom 
classes; 137 males and 129 females in the middle classes; 77 males and 92 females in the top classes. P-values are 
from Mann-Whitney U tests for the difference in number correct between tests.  
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A-2. Student behavioral characteristics, by gender and class level 
  Overall Male Female   
Variable 
Class 
level 
Mean N SD Mean N Mean N Diff p-value 
Guess Rank  
Test 2 
Overall 2.573 560 0.941 2.441 290 2.715 270 -0.273 0.001 
Bottom 2.698 126 0.998 2.632 76 2.800 50 -0.168 0.502 
Middle 2.515 266 0.933 2.358 137 2.682 129 -0.325 0.005 
Top 2.571 168 0.906 2.403 77 2.714 91 -0.312 0.030  
 
         
Guess Rank  
Test 4 
Overall 2.455 560 1.072 2.36 289 2.557 271 -0.197 0.028 
Bottom 3.048 126 0.954 2.934 76 3.220 50 -0.286 0.088 
Middle 2.481 266 1.068 2.365 137 2.605 129 -0.240 0.072 
Top 1.970 168 0.925 1.776 76 2.130 92 -0.354 0.011  
 
         
Overconfidence 
Test 2 (Actual- 
Guessed rank) 
Overall -0.221 560 1.159 -0.097 290 -0.356 270 0.259 0.016 
Bottom -0.484 126 1.129 -0.539 76 -0.400 50 -0.139 0.627 
Middle -0.139 266 1.185 0.051 137 -0.341 129 0.392 0.011 
Top -0.155 168 1.116 0.078 77 -0.352 91 0.430 0.036  
 
         
Overconfidence 
Test 4 (Actual-
Guessed rank) 
Overall -0.136 560 1.136 0.042 289 -0.325 271 0.366 <0.001 
Bottom 0.310 126 1.196 0.408 76 0.160 50 0.248 0.180 
Middle -0.244 266 1.128 -0.117 137 -0.380 129 0.263 0.078 
Top -0.298 168 1.018 -0.039 76 -0.511 92 0.471 0.001  
          
Incentivized risk 
scale (1-5; 5 most 
risky) 
Overall 2.588 561 1.573 3.103 290 2.037 271 1.067 <0.001 
Bottom 2.317 126 1.505 2.763 76 1.640 50 1.123 0.001 
Middle 2.613 266 1.555 3.066 137 2.132 129 0.934 <0.001 
Top 2.751 169 1.632 3.506 77 2.120 92 1.387 <0.001  
          
Non-incentivized 
risk scale (0-10; 
10 most risky) 
  
Overall 6.161 559 2.150 6.410 288 5.897 271 0.513 0.001 
Bottom 5.427 124 2.292 5.824 74 4.840 50 0.984 0.006 
Middle 6.308 266 2.049 6.489 137 6.116 129 0.373 0.048 
Top 6.467 169 2.087 6.831 77 6.163 92 0.668 0.028 
Guess Rank ranges from 1-4 (1 is the best rank and 4 is the worst rank). Overconfidence is calculated as Actual-
Guessed rank (actual rank based on modal rank in 1000 simulations). P-values are from Mann-Whitney U tests.  
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A-3. Student midterm scores, by gender and class level 
 
  Overall Male Female   
Variable Class level Mean N SD Mean N Mean N Diff p-value  
Math Overall 49.842 463 23.379 49.457 230 50.223 233 -0.767 0.852 
 Bottom 27.064 94 19.407 25.204 54 29.575 40 -4.371 0.363 
 Middle 48.043 234 18.009 50.534 116 45.593 118 4.941 0.045 
 Top 68.822 135 18.073 69.200 60 68.520 75 0.680 0.629 
           
Malay Overall 53.620 463 19.600 49.700 230 57.489 233 -7.789 <0.001 
 Bottom 31.638 94 18.686 28.833 54 35.425 40 -6.592 0.138 
 Middle 53.667 234 14.681 51.009 116 56.280 118 -5.271 0.004 
 Top 68.844 135 11.615 65.950 60 71.160 75 -5.210 0.014 
           
English Overall 63.641 462 17.896 62.000 230 65.267 232 -3.267 0.125 
 Bottom 41.462 93 16.731 39.259 54 44.513 39 -5.254 0.188 
 Middle 63.889 234 12.823 64.483 116 63.305 118 1.178 0.264 
 Top 78.489 135 7.753 77.667 60 79.147 75 -1.480 0.167 
           
Overall Overall 54.936 432 17.403 52.414 215 57.436 217 -5.022 0.005 
 Bottom 32.739 94 12.150 30.973 54 35.123 40 -4.150 0.200 
 Middle 54.637 203 11.165 54.089 101 55.179 102 -1.091 0.526 
 Top 70.843 135 9.114 68.892 60 72.404 75 -3.512 0.060 
Midterm scores are available for 4 schools, and are on a scale of 0-100. P-values are from Mann-Whitney U tests. 
 
  
41 
 
A-4. Student opinions and stereotypes, by gender and class level 
 
  Overall Male Female   
Variable 
Class 
level 
Mean N SD Mean N Mean N Diff p-value  
Like Math Overall 0.721 555 0.449 0.743 284 0.697 271 0.046 0.232 
 Bottom 0.585 123 0.495 0.548 73 0.640 50 -0.092 0.311 
 Middle 0.736 265 0.442 0.787 136 0.682 129 0.105 0.054 
 Top 0.796 167 0.404 0.853 75 0.750 92 0.103 0.100 
Like Science Overall 0.770 556 0.421 0.812 287 0.725 269 0.087 0.015 
 Bottom 0.637 124 0.483 0.635 74 0.640 50 -0.005 0.956 
 Middle 0.795 264 0.404 0.853 136 0.734 128 0.119 0.017 
 Top 0.827 168 0.379 0.909 77 0.758 91 0.151 0.010 
Like Reading Overall 0.752 537 0.432 0.647 275 0.863 262 -0.215 <0.001 
 Bottom 0.648 122 0.480 0.514 72 0.840 50 -0.326 <0.001 
 Middle 0.789 251 0.409 0.714 126 0.864 125 -0.150 0.004 
 Top 0.774 164 0.419 0.662 77 0.874 87 -0.211 0.001 
Good at Math Overall 0.422 552 0.494 0.472 286 0.368 266 0.104 0.014 
 Bottom 0.240 121 0.429 0.233 73 0.250 48 -0.017 0.830 
 Middle 0.392 263 0.489 0.485 136 0.291 127 0.194 0.001 
 Top 0.601 168 0.491 0.675 77 0.538 91 0.137 0.072 
Good at Science Overall 0.410 554 0.492 0.455 286 0.362 268 0.093 0.027 
 Bottom 0.295 122 0.458 0.274 73 0.327 49 -0.053 0.534 
 Middle 0.407 263 0.492 0.500 136 0.307 127 0.193 0.001 
 Top 0.497 169 0.501 0.545 77 0.457 92 0.089 0.251 
Good at Reading Overall 0.722 554 0.448 0.675 286 0.772 268 -0.098 0.010 
 Bottom 0.677 124 0.469 0.622 74 0.760 50 -0.138 0.107 
 Middle 0.695 262 0.461 0.667 135 0.724 127 -0.058 0.311 
 Top 0.798 168 0.403 0.740 77 0.846 91 -0.106 0.090 
Rank Science 1 Overall 0.714 532 0.452 0.722 270 0.706 262 0.016 0.681 
 Bottom 0.567 104 0.498 0.567 60 0.568 44 -0.002 0.988 
 Middle 0.695 262 0.461 0.716 134 0.672 128 0.045 0.435 
 Top 0.837 166 0.370 0.855 76 0.822 90 0.033 0.567 
Guess Science Stream Overall 0.442 559 0.497 0.476 288 0.406 271 0.070 0.097 
 Bottom 0.208 125 0.408 0.267 75 0.120 50 0.147 0.049 
 Middle 0.406 266 0.492 0.453 137 0.357 129 0.096 0.112 
 Top 0.673 168 0.471 0.724 76 0.630 92 0.093 0.201 
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A-4, continued 
 
  Overall Male Female   
Variable Class level Mean N Mean N Mean N Diff p-value 
Gender better at math       
 Overall -0.220 549 -0.270 282 -0.169 267 -0.101 0.053 
 Bottom -0.169 118 -0.157 70 -0.188 48 0.030 0.811 
 Middle -0.229 262 -0.259 135 -0.197 127 -0.062 0.415 
 Top -0.243 169 -0.390 77 -0.120 92 -0.270 0.003 
Gender better at reading       
 Overall 0.376 553 0.320 284 0.435 269 -0.115 0.048 
 Bottom 0.248 121 0.236 72 0.265 49 -0.029 0.974 
 Middle 0.420 264 0.378 135 0.465 129 -0.087 0.289 
 Top 0.399 168 0.299 77 0.484 91 -0.185 0.040 
Gender better at science       
 Overall -0.160 550 -0.236 284 -0.079 266 -0.157 0.003 
 Bottom -0.092 120 -0.194 72 0.063 48 -0.257 0.041 
 Middle -0.206 262 -0.237 135 -0.173 127 -0.064 0.433 
  Top -0.137 168 -0.273 77 -0.022 91 -0.251 0.007 
Attitudes and beliefs are based on dichotomized variables where 1=yes/agree and 0=no/disagree, except for “Gender 
better at” questions which are coded -1 (Boys are better) 0 (Both are equally as good) and 1 (Girls are better). 
Socioeconomic status are dichotomized variables for each parent holding at least a bachelor's degree. P-values are from 
Mann-Whitney U tests. 
 
 
A-5. Descriptive statistics of student characteristics, by gender and class level 
  Overall Male Female   
Variable 
Class 
level Mean N SD Mean N Mean N Diff p-value 
Female Overall 0.483 561 0.500       
 Bottom 0.397 126 0.491       
 Middle 0.485 266 0.501       
 Top 0.544 169 0.500       
Father is college grad Overall 0.451 552 0.498 0.483 286 0.417 266 0.065 0.124 
 Bottom 0.276 123 0.449 0.297 74 0.245 49 0.052 0.526 
 Middle 0.462 262 0.499 0.518 137 0.400 125 0.118 0.056 
 Top 0.563 167 0.498 0.600 75 0.533 92 0.067 0.384 
Mother is college grad Overall 0.367 551 0.482 0.384 284 0.348 267 0.035 0.388 
 Bottom 0.281 121 0.451 0.292 72 0.265 49 0.026 0.752 
 Middle 0.341 264 0.475 0.372 137 0.307 127 0.065 0.265 
  Top 0.470 166 0.501 0.493 75 0.451 91 0.043 0.584 
P-values are based on Mann-Whitney U tests. 
  
43 
 
A-6. Models for tournament entry (Competitiveness), excluding school without administrative 
records 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Female -0.170** -0.144* -0.136* -0.142* -0.150* 
 (0.0481) (0.0485) (0.0473) (0.0485) (0.0557) 
Num. Correct Test 1 0.0175* 0.0260** 0.0234** 0.0264** 0.0282** 
 (0.00593) (0.00690) (0.00671) (0.00760) (0.00825) 
T-PR 0.00708 0.0177* 0.0141+ 0.0191* 0.0189* 
 (0.00838) (0.00751) (0.00686) (0.00699) (0.00746) 
Overconfidence Test 2  0.0635** 0.0527* 0.0579* 0.0666* 
  (0.0205) (0.0208) (0.0203) (0.0225) 
Nonincentivized risk    0.0385** 0.0367** 0.0373** 
   (0.00978) (0.0104) (0.0109) 
Incentivized risk   -0.00477 -0.00970 -0.0196* 
   (0.0119) (0.0128) (0.00900) 
Math stereotype    -0.0373 -0.0356 
    (0.0432) (0.0455) 
Likes math    -0.00939 -0.00998 
    (0.0462) (0.0500) 
Thinks is good at math    -0.0363 -0.0186 
    (0.0507) (0.0583) 
Expects science stream    0.0688 0.0741 
    (0.0425) (0.0425) 
Father is college grad    -0.0842 -0.0563 
    (0.0576) (0.0554) 
Mother is college grad    0.00298 -0.0173 
    (0.0698) (0.0698) 
Midterm math score     -0.000150 
     (0.00204) 
Midterm overall score     -0.00490 
     (0.00420) 
Observations 464 463 462 439 409 
All models provide OLS linear probability results that include class fixed effects. T-PR is the difference between 
number correct on the tournament (Test 2) versus piece-rate test (Test 1). Overconfidence Test 2 is measured as 
the difference between Actual and Guessed rank on Test 2. Nonincentivized risk is a scale from 0-10 (10 is most 
risky). Incentivized risk is the choice between a certain option or set of lotteries, ranging a total of 1-5 (5 is most 
risky). Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. Significance levels are set at + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** 
p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
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A-7. Models for tournament entry (Competitiveness), clustered by session 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Female -0.174** -0.154** -0.154** -0.153** -0.151* 
 (0.0473) (0.0471) (0.0422) (0.0413) (0.0583) 
Num. Correct Test 1 0.0165*** 0.0222*** 0.0199*** 0.0219*** 0.0275*** 
 (0.00283) (0.00302) (0.00339) (0.00337) (0.00383) 
T-PR 0.00748 0.0152+ 0.0119 0.0160+ 0.0173+ 
 (0.00939) (0.00787) (0.00695) (0.00853) (0.00865) 
Overconfidence Test 2  0.0508** 0.0416* 0.0454** 0.0620** 
  (0.0127) (0.0169) (0.0143) (0.0177) 
Nonincentivized risk    0.0246+ 0.0245+ 0.0374* 
   (0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0119) 
Incentivized risk   -0.00648 -0.00718 -0.0225* 
   (0.0124) (0.0138) (0.00841) 
Math stereotype    -0.0000694 -0.0263 
    (0.0249) (0.0293) 
Likes math    -0.00386 -0.0210 
    (0.0243) (0.0328) 
Thinks is good at math    -0.00474 -0.00360 
    (0.0567) (0.0583) 
Expects science stream    -0.00157 0.0579 
    (0.0322) (0.0341) 
Father is college grad    -0.0406 -0.0612 
    (0.0834) (0.0644) 
Mother is college grad    0.0153 -0.00365 
    (0.0500) (0.0589) 
Midterm math score     0.0000728 
     (0.00141) 
Midterm overall score     -0.00574* 
     (0.00234) 
Observations 561 560 558 524 409 
All models provide OLS linear probability results that include session fixed effects (13 session vs 18 classes). T-
PR is the difference between number correct on the tournament (Test 2) versus piece-rate test (Test 1). 
Overconfidence Test 2 is measured as the difference between Actual and Guessed rank on Test 2. Nonincentivized 
risk is a scale from 0-10 (10 is most risky). Incentivized risk is the choice between a certain option or set of 
lotteries, ranging a total of 1-5 (5 is most risky). Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. Significance 
levels are set at + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
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A-8. Balance check of covariates for middle classes 
       
 All Males Females 
Variable Coeff SE Obs Coeff SE Obs Coeff SE Obs 
Female -0.038 0.033 266       
Math midterm score 0.282 2.399 234 -3.071 2.100 116 3.563 2.991 118 
Overall midterm score 0.610 1.320 203 -0.103 1.762 101 1.530 1.545 102 
Test 1 (Piece-Rate) -0.626+ 0.290 266 -1.058 0.651 137 -0.086 0.570 129 
Test 2 (Tournament) -0.373 0.359 266 -0.372 0.532 137 -0.338 0.394 129 
Test 3 -0.513 0.539 266 -0.793 0.518 137 -0.026 0.797 129 
Tournament-Piece Rate 0.237 0.329 266 0.656 0.396 137 -0.251 0.477 129 
Competition choice -0.015 0.031 266 -0.034 0.050 137 -0.002 0.054 129 
This table presents results of regressions of the covariates on treatment. Each row represents a regression. Analyses 
are limited to the sample of students in the middle classes. All regressions use class fixed effects. Robust standard 
errors are provided in parentheses. Significance levels are set at + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
 
 
A-9. Difference in number of correct answers between Test 2 and Test 4 by treatment in middle 
classes 
 Overall Males Females   
Class Level Mean N SD Mean N Mean N Diff p-value  
Versus lower 1.564 133 2.827 1.485 66 1.642 67 -0.157 0.832 
Versus higher 1.120 133 2.972 0.521 71 1.806 62 -1.285 0.018 
Analyses are limited to the sample of students in the middle classes. Differences are calculated by individual (Test 
4-Test 2). P-values are from Mann-Whitney U tests. 
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A-10. Change in performance due to level of competition, using whole school sample  
𝑦𝑖𝑗  =  Γ𝑗 +  𝛽1𝑉𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽3(𝑉𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒)𝑖𝑗 + 𝜃Χij + 𝜖𝑖𝑗 
𝑦𝑖𝑗 = Difference in Number of Correct Answers between Other and Own class (Test 4 - Test 2) for 
student i in class j 
Γ𝑗 is the class fixed effects 
𝑉𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 is 1 if assigned higher class and 0 if assigned lower class for student i in class j. This means 
that all the bottom classes Treatment=1 & half of middle classes Treatment=1 
Female is 1 if female and 0 if male for student i in class j 
𝑉𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 * Female is 1 if subject is assigned to higher class & is female; 0 o/w 
Χij is vector of student attributes 
 
 All Male Female 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Vs higher class -0.793* -0.794* -0.571 -0.996** -0.991** -0.814* 0.181 0.180 0.0599 
 (0.373) (0.376) (0.373) (0.313) (0.311) (0.381) (0.579) (0.590) (0.584) 
Female -0.0834 -0.0878 -0.0543       
 (0.328) (0.337) (0.363)       
Fem* vs higher 0.672 0.674 0.356       
 (0.438) (0.441) (0.481)       
Competition  -0.0213 -0.0138  0.143 0.120  -0.473 -0.227 
  (0.280) (0.237)  (0.377) (0.328)  (0.437) (0.400) 
Test 1   -0.0324   -0.0302   -0.0637 
   (0.0215)   (0.0307)   (0.0424) 
T-PR   -0.374***   -0.305***   -0.456*** 
   (0.0412)   (0.0475)   (0.0661) 
Observations 561 561 561 290 290 290 271 271 271 
All models provide OLS linear probability results that include class fixed effects. The whole school sample is used; thus 
those who received the treatment “Vshigher” are half the students in the middle classes and all the students in the bottom 
classes, which is not random. Competition is the competition choice prior to Round 3. Test 1 is the number of correct 
answers in Test 1 (Piece-Rate). T-PR is the difference between number correct on the tournament (Test 2) versus piece-
rate test (Test 1). Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. Significance levels are set as: + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** 
p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
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A-11. Change in number of correct answers between Test 2 and Test 4 due to level of competition, 
clustered by session 
 All Male Female 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Versus top class -1.002* -1.017* -0.798 -0.983* -0.995* -0.871+ 0.177 0.175 0.0514 
 (0.395) (0.398) (0.453) (0.382) (0.380) (0.428) (0.674) (0.693) (0.698) 
Female 0.0105 -0.0410 -0.107       
 (0.549) (0.555) (0.616)       
Female* top class 1.159 1.171 0.847       
 (0.606) (0.629) (0.764)       
Competition  -0.451 -0.314  -0.340 -0.218  -0.645 -0.488 
  (0.241) (0.226)  (0.420) (0.365)  (0.549) (0.572) 
Test 1   -0.250   -0.377   0.000604 
   (0.171)   (0.197)   (0.225) 
T-PR   -1.107***   -0.795**   -1.357*** 
   (0.122)   (0.136)   (0.224) 
Observations 266 266 266 137 137 137 129 129 129 
Analyses are limited to the sample of students in the middle classes. All models provide OLS linear probability results 
that include session fixed effects (7 sessions vs 8 classes). Competition is the competition choice prior to Round 3. Test 1 
is the number of correct answers on Test 1 (Piece-Rate). T-PR is the difference between number correct on the 
tournament (Test 2) versus piece-rate test (Test 1). Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. Significance 
levels are set at: + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
 
 
A-12. Number of correct answers on Test 4 due to level of competition, clustered by class 
 All Male Female 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Versus top class -1.438* -1.384+ -0.825+ -1.368+ -1.325+ -0.897+ -0.157 -0.153 0.0588 
 (0.596) (0.616) (0.423) (0.590) (0.605) (0.393) (0.715) (0.694) (0.626) 
Female -0.343 -0.151 -0.118       
 (0.738) (0.763) (0.612)       
Female* top class 1.234 1.187 0.873       
 (0.826) (0.750) (0.755)       
Competition  1.671* -0.306  1.293 -0.238  2.132** -0.598 
  (0.580) (0.243)  (0.975) (0.362)  (0.459) (0.583) 
Test 2   0.954***   0.921***   1.016*** 
   (0.0351)   (0.0369)   (0.0492) 
T-PR   -0.357***   -0.208*   -0.502*** 
   (0.0439)   (0.0652)   (0.0909) 
Observations 266 266 266 137 137 137 129 129 129 
Analyses are limited to the sample of students in the middle classes. All models provide OLS linear probability results 
that include class fixed effects. Competition is the competition choice prior to Round 3. Test 2 is the number of correct 
answers in Test 2 (Tournament). T-PR is the difference between number correct on the tournament (Test 2) versus piece-
rate test (Test 1). Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. Significance levels are set at: + p<0.10 * p<0.05 ** 
p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
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A-13. Change in number of correct answers between Test 2 and Test 4 due to level of competition, 
controlling for chance of winning 
 All Male Female 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Versus top class -0.999* -1.014* -0.942* -0.966* -0.979* -0.963* 0.181 0.179 0.100 
 (0.330) (0.335) (0.385) (0.315) (0.314) (0.355) (0.603) (0.622) (0.680) 
Female 0.0136 -0.0378 -0.0337       
 (0.571) (0.583) (0.602)       
Female* top class 1.155+ 1.168 1.026       
 (0.601) (0.623) (0.783)       
Competition  -0.447 -0.277  -0.378 -0.164  -0.722 -0.808 
  (0.258) (0.282)  (0.418) (0.427)  (0.563) (0.516) 
Chance win T1   0.000083   -0.00787   0.0104 
   (0.00673)   (0.00669)   (0.0115) 
Chance T2-T1   -0.0319**   -0.0190   -0.0367* 
   (0.00903)   (0.0119)   (0.0134) 
Observations 266 266 266 137 137 137 129 129 129 
Analyses are limited to the sample of students in the middle classes. All models provide OLS linear probability results 
that include class fixed effects. Competition is the competition choice prior to Round 3. Chance winning T1 is the chance 
of getting 1st place if Test 1 were a tournament with groups of 4 competitors (percentages obtained by simulating 1,000 
draws of groups of 3 competitors for each individual, by class). Chance T2-T1 is the difference in the chances of winning 
in Test 1 and Test 2. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. Significance levels are set at: + p<0.10 * p<0.05 
** p<0.01 *** p<0.001. 
 
 
